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Summary 
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce 
them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers’ beliefs. Relevant 
mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks 
deeply-rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as an indirect signal 
of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a stronger signal compared to 
that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept job 
qualifications which are lower than those achievable through the embodied educational 
level. This could explain the over education problem that characterizes many countries, Italy 
included. The aim of the paper is to investigate whether the above mentioned mechanisms 
are adopted by immigrants in Italy, a crucial country for EU immigration flows, and if they 
are useful in increasing immigrants’ likelihood of employment. The empirical analysis has 
been conducted using the dataset from a national Labour Force Survey which provides 
information on 6,860 documented immigrants. We estimate a logit model for immigrants’ 
likelihood of being employed, focusing on the above mentioned mechanisms: reputation, 
ethnic networks and educational level. Moreover we concentrate on the interaction effects of 
the mechanisms and investigate whether one of them wins on the others. Results show that 
each of the three mechanisms is statistically and economically significant and exerts positive 
influence: all factors contribute to increasing the immigrant’s probability of being employed. 
Anyway, a high level of education increases the probability of being employed more than the 
belonging to ethnic networks deeply-rooted in Italy. The specific embodied capital of 
workers matter relatively more. This is relevant for labour public policies in this specific 
realm since the human capital lever is a possible direct target of various public policies and 
private human capital investments.  
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Education, Reputation or Network?  






The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some 
behaviours or signals to modify employers‟ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal 
reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as 
an indirect signal of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a stronger signal compared to 
that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept job qualifications which are lower 
than those achievable through the embodied educational level. This could explain the over education problem that 
characterizes many countries, Italy included. 
The aim of the paper is to investigate whether the above mentioned mechanisms are adopted by immigrants in 
Italy, a crucial country for EU immigration flows, and if they are useful in increasing immigrants‟ likelihood of 
employment. The empirical analysis has been conducted using the dataset from a national Labour Force Survey 
which  provides  information  on  6,860  documented  immigrants.  We  estimate  a  logit  model  for  immigrants‟ 
likelihood of being employed, focusing on the above mentioned mechanisms: reputation, ethnic networks and 
educational level. Moreover we concentrate on the interaction effects of the mechanisms and investigate whether 
one of them wins on the others. Results show that each of the three mechanisms is statistically and economically 
significant and exert positive influence: all factors contribute to increasing the immigrant‟s probability of being 
employed.  Anyway,  a  high  level  of  education  increases  the  probability  of  being  employed  more  than  the 
belonging to ethnic networks deeply-rooted in Italy. The specific embodied capital of workers matter relatively 
more. This is relevant for labour public policies in this specific realm since the human capital lever is a possible 
direct target if various public policies and private human capital investments.  
 
  
Keywords: Educational qualifications, migrant networks, immigrant employability, reputation, segmented labour 
markets  
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1. Introduction  
In the last twenty years international migrations have been characterised by sustained increase and deep 
changes, that have especially involved the countries of Southern Europe, modifying their role from 
emigration areas to hosting countries mostly for people coming from the less developed areas of the 
world. This phenomenon has regarded also Italy, where  the migration phenomenon has reached a 
considerable weight. Actually, in  2008 the foreign presence in Italy has been evaluated in more than 4 
million  people, with a percentage of undocumented people evaluated of about 8,7%. Documented 
workers are 1,5 million and, including the moonlighting, migrant workforce sums up at 2 million units. 
Foreign people in Italy are, moreover, characterized by an average age of 32 years (versus 44 years of 
Italians). For what concerns education level, 49% of foreigners holds at least a college degree, versus 
33,2% of Italians. 
The high education level of migrants is a phenomenon already exploited in many recent works about 
migration (Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos 1990, Borjas 2003, Battu and Sloane 2002, Devillanova and 
Frattini 2006, Gross and Schmitt 2006). What emerges with strength is a situation of over education: 
migrant workers holds higher education levels than local workers for same job positions. 
Usually the inclusion of foreign people in the host country comes with an attitude of residents often 
not in favour of immigration, although the socio-economic benefits of the phenomenon are very often 
visible and clear even at first sight. This negative attitude exerts its effects in the labour market, where 
adverse selection factors undermine the proper matching between supply and demand. 
The adverse selection that can be met by migrants in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt 
some behaviours or signals to modify employers‟ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms at reaching this purpose 
are: personal reputation, belonging to ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country, and high 
education levels as an indirect signal of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a 
“stronger” signal than that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept 
lower job positions. This could explain the over education  problem highlighted above. 
The  main  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  the  mentioned  mechanisms  are  adopted  by 
immigrants in Italy, and if they are useful levers in increasing  migrants‟ likelihood of employment.  
The empirical analysis has been conducted using an official dataset provided by the National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT), collecting information about 6860 documented immigrants in Italy. We estimate a 
logit  model  for  immigrants‟  likelihood  of  being  employed,  focusing  on  the  above  mentioned 
mechanisms:  reputation,  ethnic  networks  and  education  level.  Moreover  we  concentrate  on  the 
interaction effects and the marginal effects of the mechanisms and investigate whether one of them 
wins on the others. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  is  devoted  to  the  conceptual  framework  that  will 
constitute the basis for the empirical analysis. In section three the database and the social context are 
presented. Section four comments on and presents the empirical framework, focusing on the drivers of 
employability  for  migrants  in  our  sample  and  on  the  interaction  effects  and  marginal  effects  of 
reputation, migrant networks and education level as levers of migrants‟ employability. The last section 
concludes the paper by summarising results and offering some insights for policy making.   
 
2. Conceptual framework   
The mismatch between education level and job position in migrant workers has been pointed out by 
many authors
1, who, for different countries and situations, have verified a higher education level in 
migrant workers compared with local workers for same job positions.  
In the human capital theory higher levels of education have positive impact s on the advancement of 
minorities, increasing their likelihood of more satisfying jobs, higher income s and career prospects
2. 
Nevertheless in presence of a phenome non of over education, the predictions of the human capital 
                                                 
1 Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos (1990) for Asian migrants in Us, Borjas (2003) for the US, Battu and Sloane (2002) for UK, 
Devillanova and Frattini (2006) for irregular migrants in Italy, Gross and Schmitt (2006) for France. In some countries, as 
Australia, over education has been exploited by a proper legislation of welcoming more educated immigrants (Kifle, 2008) 
2 Berg (1969), Parsons (1968). See Peterson (1971), Sklare (1971) and Sung (1967) for the economic achievements of  high 
educated minorities as Jews and Asian Americans.    3 
theory do not fit well. In the structural critique
3 to the human capital theory,  the existence of structural 
barriers prevents migrants from obtaining a job coherent with their education level. 
A  fundamental element for the inclusion of foreign people in the host country is the attitude of 
residents, which is often not in favour of immigration, although the socio -economic benefits of the 
phenomenon are very often visible and clear even at first si ght if not from specific micro and macro 
analyses. This negative attitude exerts its effects in the labour market, where adverse selection factors 
undermine the proper matching between supply and demand from the very beginning, even influencing 
migrant‟s likelihood of entering the labour market. 
Migrants aim at modifying employers beliefs by adopting mechanisms that may mitigate or tackle such 
adverse selection effects.  
Reputation is definitely the major factor migrants may use when entering the labour market. A migrant 
may then base his reputation and competitive advantage on two distinct mechanisms. The first one 
structures  “personal  reputation”  on  the  specific  experience  and  curriculum  vitae  the  worker 
accumulates over time if staying in the same labour market. The second one relies on the so called 
„migrant networks‟, or complex webs of interpersonal links that join migrants with „older‟ migrants and 
non migrants in the locations of origin and arrival, through family, friendship and ethnic connections 
(Massey, 1988). From the employer point of view, the link with other employees that have provided a 
good effort and behaviour is a criterion of selection and valuation. We may refer to the theory of 
„statistical discrimination‟ (Becker 1959, Arrow 1972, 1973, 1998; Phelps 1972, Heckman 1998), by 
which one applies to a single individual the characteristics of the network the worker belongs to.  
A further mechanism aimed at modifying employer‟s beliefs is the use by workers of the education level 
as an indirect signal of workers productivity (Spence, 1973; Riley, 1979). The migrant status makes 
necessary a stronger signal compared to the resident competitor. This often induces or forces the 
migrant to step down from the proper segment of labour markets, descending to a lower market in 
terms of education levels. This explains in part the phenomenon of over education we commented on 
above. More in detail, the education signal sent to the market should be even stronger for newcomers
4, 
migrants without a solid reputa tion and networks as embodied assets, or migrants belonging to 
communities for which the social attitude is specifically negative
5.  
On the basis of the considerations made above, our aim is to analyse the behaviour of migrants in the 
Italian job market. We want particularly verify the extent to which the highlighted mechanisms are 
exploited by migrants and the way they affect the likelihood of being employed. 
 
3. Data and description of the socio-economic context 
In order to fulfil the aims of this work the analysis is carried out by examining an official dataset 
provided by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)
6 of 6,860 migrant units, regularly living in Italy. 
More specifically, in order to empirically analyse the determinants of  employability for the sample, we 
only consider potential „workforce‟ units, people between 15 and 75 years (87% of the sample). The 
sample  possesses  the  following  features.  Women  are  the  57.3%  of  workforce.  Main  countries  of 
origins,  besides  Germany and Switzerland,  EU countries  placed at third and first  positions in  the 
ranking, are: Albania, Romania (when writing the most numerous communities in Italy) and Morocco. 
Those three constitute the 20% of the total. 55.7% of migrants live in Northern Italy. Their average age 
is 38 years, and 59% of them are married. Some other descriptive statistics are useful to sketch the 
overall socio economic framework under analysis. As far as the labour market is concerned, 57.6% of 
the people is employed, 35% is inactive and 6.6% unemployed. Among employed, 40% is working in 
                                                 
3 See, among others, Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos (1990). 
4 Which is in line with the idea that the first international migrants usually do not come from the bottom of the community 
hierarchy, but from the middle ranges (Massey, 1988). 
5 E.g. Africans and Romanian in Italy, compared to southern Americans who are more easily accepted for cultural and 
crime-related reasons. 
6 Data are not publicly free. We bought from ISTAT a sufficient amount of data for the analysis in 2006. Data stem from 
the Labour workforce survey ISTAT carries out every three months on employed and unemployed people. We got the first 
semester of 2006. Future analyses may further exploit panel based structure of the data. One problem is the unbalanced 
nature of  labour force workers survey due to the partial rotation (turnover) of the panel semester by semester.     4 
services, 36% in industry and the rest in agricultural sector. 85% of them have a job with a tenure track 
(not atypical job) position.  
Finally,  regarding  education  we  note  that  45%  possess  primary  or  high  school  diploma,  39%  a 
secondary school degree and 11% a University Laurea degree or even Master/PhD
7. If we look at job 
positions of employed workers in the sample, having in mind as comparison the shares of education 
attainments, we observe that 75% of  migrants are „blue collars‟ (table 1), with a striking difference 
between Italians and migrants. Further, it is evident that migrants occupy a non coherent job compared 
to education levels: 34% of them with university degree and 69% of people with a diploma are blue 
collar (Tab. 2). Over education then emerges as a stylized fact on which our reasoning may revolve 
around. Migrants then tend to embody, taking as parameter a similar job/position in the market, higher 
education levels. 
 
Tab. 1: job positions of Italians and migrants in our sample 




Blue collar  75,3  34,7 
White collar  19,8  27,1 
Director/head   4,9  38,2 
     
Total  100,0  100,0 
Source: Istat (2007),own elaborations 
 
Tab. 2: Education levels and job positions of migrants in our sample 
Job  Education level 
(%) 
  High   Medium   Basic  No education 
         
Blue collar  34,0  68,5  92,3  94,3 
White collar  38,1  27,9  7,2  5,7 
Director/head  27,9  3,6  0,5  0,0 
         
Total  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
         
Source: Istat (2007), own elaborations 
 
The phenomenon of over education is even clearer if we subdivide migrants in those coming 
from developed and less developed areas of the world. The latter present stronger mismatch between 
education level and job position in the market (tab. 3). We note that for individuals coming from more 
developed areas a positive correlation between education and job levels is implied. Foreigners having 
high education are either white collar (55%) or head positions (42%), while less educated are for the 
great majority blue collars (87%). The opposite is true for migrants coming from less developed areas: 
61% of high educated is blue collar; 23% white collar and only 18% in head positions. For those having 
a medium education level, the difference is also striking: 55% of migrants coming from more developed 
areas is white collar, 84% of those born in less developed areas is blue collar. From any angle and 
perspective, then, over education in the job market is an issue worth studying.  
 
Tab. 3: Distribution by job, country and education level 
Job  Education 
(%) 
  High   Medium   Basic  No education 
  More developed areas 
Blue collar  3,2  37,6  86,2  100,0 
White collar  55,1  54,6  13,8  0,0 
Director/head  41,7  7,9  0,0  0,0 
         
Total  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
                                                 
7 We note that in data from  Italy‟s General Census of Population the same percentages for Italians were 56%, 26%, 7%.   5 
         
  Less developed areas 
Blue collar  60,5  84,4  94,5  94,8 
White collar  22,8  14,1  4,9  5,2 
Director/head  16,7  1,5  0,6  0,0 
         
Total  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
         
Source: Istat (2007),own elaborations 
 
Starting  from  the  mismatch  between  high  education  level    and  jobs  migrants  get  in  the  Italian 
marketplace,  we  comment  on  the  fundamental  issue  at  the  basis  of  the  present  work.  If  in  fact, 
education (certification) and then in general the education level, does not represent the means by which 
a migrant obtain a coherent job, it is necessary to analyse if education is a mechanism adopted by 
migrants,  in  substitution or  together with  reputation,  to modify  Italian employers‟  beliefs,  just  for 
entering the labour market. 
The aim is to verify the extent to which mechanisms such as education and reputation are exploited by 
migrants in Italy as levers of employability, and the way they affect the likelihood of being employed.  
 
4. Empirical analyses  
4.1 The empirical model 
In  order  to  analyze  the  drivers  of  employability  for  migrants  in  our  sample,  we  describe  the 
empirical/econometric  framework.  We  use  a  basic  logit  model,  estimating  the  likelihood  of  being 
employed
8. The logit model we use as framework is then in brief: 
If 

y  yi  ,yi  0,1  ,i1,...,T, where

yi, is a binary dependent variable, and T sample size T. 












k) is the regressors vector and






 The dependent variable of our empirical model is  the binary index EMP (assuming value 1 if the 
migrant is employed)
9.  Among covariates (described also in table 4), we focus mainly on those factors 
that capture ways used to modify employers beliefs.  
We define in the comments below „marginal effect of variable X
j‟ the partial derivative of f (not of the 
estimated  probability)  with  respect  to  X
j
.  We  will  then  deal  with  proper  marginal  effects  after 
commenting on the main results of the logit estimates.  
                                                 
8 Further analyses may be carried out extending the reasoning to order logit models that take into account the type of jobs 
people get. 
9 We refer to table 4 for a summary of variables used in the analysis.    6 
 Table 4 – Description of dependent and independent variables 
Acronym  Description 
   
EMP (b)  Employment status (1 employed) 
GEND (b)  Gender, 1 if male 
AGE  Age of workers 
CIV1 (b)  1 if widow 
CIV2 (b)10  1 if married 
CIV3 (b)  1 if divorced 
ZONE1,2,4,5(b)  Geographical  Dummies  (1north  east,  2north  west,  4south, 
5islands)11 
EDUC1,3,4(b)  Educational  level  dummies  (1PhD  and  university,  3secondary 
school, 4no level)12 
RES  Years of staying in the country13 
COUNTRY1-16 (b)  14 main dummies capturing countries of origins of the workers14  
(b) Means Binary 
 
Tab. 5: Dummies for the first 15 countries in the sample 
  Country  
Country_1  Switzerland 
Country _2  Albania 
Country _3  Germany 
Country _4  Romania 
Country _5  France 
Country _6  Morocco 
Country _7  Macedonia 
Country _8  Argentina 
Country _9  Polonia 
Country _10  Ukraine 
Country _11  Belgium 
Country _12  Brazil 
Country _13  Philippines 
Country _14  UK 
Country _15  Tunisia 
Country_16  Residual 112 countries (22,287 migrants in the sample) 
 
 
4.2 Employability analysis  
We  now  comment  on  the  main  results  deriving  from  econometric  analyses  (table  6
15). Among 
individual features, we find many  significant  drivers of employability. Being male increases the 
likelihood of finding a job, as well as  AGE exerts a positive influence, with an interesting concave 
dynamics: the benefit of getting older shows plausible diminishing marginal effects over time.  
The likelihood instead decreases for married women (the  coefficient is that linked to CIV2), while it 
increases for married men (CIV2*GEND captures this result). Finally, employability is logically higher 
in north east Italy, and lower in the South and Islands (Sicily, Sardinia), the less developed areas of the 
country
16. 
The signal provided by the factor EDUC is statistically significant and confirm s what proposed above. 
In particular, higher education levels increases the likelihood of being employed, while lower ones or no 
title at all  decrease that probability. Then, it means that if on the one hand education levels are not 
drivers of job positions, they assume a key meaning for employability as such. 
Education levels are a way migrants use to influence and modify employer‟s beliefs. 
                                                 
10 An interaction term between CIV2 and GEN is also created.  
11 Central Italy is the excluded one.  
12 College is the excluded factor.  
13 1 means less then one year, 11 more than eleven.  
14 See table 5. Tunisia is the excluded factor.  
15 All regressions present high statistical performances in terms of fit and correctly predicted values. 
16 We remark that the value added per capita ranges from values of around 23000-30000€ in the north and 12-14000€ in the 
south.    7 
Reputation is captured here by the factor RES, which is included in association to its squared term, and 
by  the  country  of  origins  dummies  COUNTRY1-14.  RES  as  well  as  AGE  shows  a  significant  and 
economically  plausible  couple  of  positive  and  negative  terms,  identifying  a  concave  relationship: 
marginal benefits of staying in the country fade away over time. 
The country of origin also exert as expected the following influence on employability. Positive links to 
EMP are shown for Switzerland, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Philippines; those are mostly representing 
very strong regarding inclusion and large ethnic groups in Italy, apart from Swiss people
17. Summing up, 
being part of an embedded and historically present community increases the  individual likelihood of 
being employed.  Albanians and  Philippines  are associated to quite low or  absent  education  level 
(around 60% of those workers). 64% of migrant from Philippines have lived in Italy for 10 years and 
more  (table  7).  Migrants  coming  from  such  places  tend  to  adopt  reputation  strategies  in  a 
comprehensive meaning in order to affect employer‟s beliefs and increase employability opportunities.  
 
Tab. 6: logistic regression (1) 
 
Logistic regression   
Number of obs   =   5986 
Prob > chi2     =  0.0000 
Pseudo R2       =  0.2744 
Log likelihood = -2959.6365 
EMP  Coef.  z  P>|z| 
       
GEND  0.7931047  7.67  0.000 
AGE  0.4143748  24.46  0.000 
AGE2  -0.0052088  -25.67  0.000 
CIV2  -0.9536369  -9.38  0.000 
CIV2*GEND  1.632011  11.29  0.000 
CIV3  0.6488868  4.22  0.000 
CIV1  0.013926  0.07  0.946 
ZONE1  0.1764397  1.75  0.080 
ZONE 2  0.2895298  2.90  0.004 
ZONE 4  -0.522632  -4.84  0.000 
ZONE 5  -0.4017026  -2.85  0.004 
EDUC1  0.2436025  2.20  0.028 
EDUC3  -0.4363291  -6.07  0.000 
EDUC4  -0.3684178  -2.34  0.020 
RES  0.3220897  4.56  0.000 
RES2  -0.0179987  -3.68  0.000 
Country_1  0.5883272  2.12  0.034 
Country _2  0.6675524  2.38  0.017 
Country _3  0.2748442  0.98  0.327 
Country _4  1.061223  3.64  0.000 
Country _5  0.3328498  1.12  0.262 
Country _6  0.1576163  0.54  0.591 
Country _7  0.0248208  0.07  0.941 
Country _8  0.4171235  1.27  0.204 
Country _9  0.5051599  1.55  0.122 
Country _10  1.451889  4.04  0.000 
Country _11  0.45233  1.35  0.179 
Country _12  0.3518658  1.01  0.312 
Country _13  2.074475  5.29  0.000 
Country _14  0.5126857  1.50  0.135 
Country _16  0.5504545  2.10  0.035 
_cons  -8.797021  -18.63  0.000 
   
 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   77.34% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   72.50% 
Correctly classified                        75.43% 
                                                 
17 98% of those have Italian citizenship.    8 
 
 As far as Romania and Ukraine are concerned, instead, we note a high education level which is typical 
of eastern EU migrants (around 65% with college degree and above) and a period of staying generally 
shorter than five years. We observe that the education level is a key factor to compensate for a generally 
lower reputation (the period of staying is shorter; moreover eastern EU, mainly males, do not benefit 
from positive attitude depending on high crime rates brought about by such communities, including the 
critical issue of „gypsies minorities‟ coming from Romania that live in Italy), at least if compared to 
Philippines, who are highly integrated even for religious reasons (catholic religion).  
 
 
Tab. 7: Education and years of permanence in Italy (for those arising relevant in the analysis) 
Country   Education 
(%) 
Years of permanence in Italy 
(%) 
  Medium high  Basic  Total  1-5 years  5-10 years  >10 years  Total 
               
Albania  34,0  66,0  100,0  30,4  39,6  30,0  100,0 
Philippines  41,6  58,4  100,0  14,2  21,2  64,6  100,0 
Romania  63,3  36,7  100,0  49,3  35,9  14,8  100,0 
Ukraine  65,8  34,2  100,0  54,7  34,2  11,1  100,0 
               
Source: own elaboration from Istat data (2006) 
 
4.3 Education level, personal reputation or network? 
It is now worth analysing more in depth three mechanisms that may be adopted to affect the set of 
employer‟s beliefs: personal reputation, membership to a well integrated community, education level. 
Table 8 presents the results of an additional econometric exercise, based on a reduced number of 
covariates, but focusing on new variables and some factor‟s interactions we describe in brief. 
Among  new  variables  specifications,  PR1  is  a  dummy  that  associates  the  value  1  to  the  first  15 
communities in terms of size. Differently from the 14 dummies we used above, we now rely on the 
effective size of communities in Italy. Such 15 countries
18 represent 37.3% of people in our sample. 
EDUCAT is instead a dummy assuming value 1 if the worker holds at least a college degree. 
We then insert in the analysis interactions between mechanisms, specifically interactions between RES, 
PR1 and EDUCAT. 
The regression below in table 8 shows the  following main facts. PR1 is  statistically significant and 
positive  in its sign: the economic  meaning  is that belonging to  strong  migrant  network increases 
employability. This result confirms and makes more robust what we also found above.  RES is again 
relevant as commented on above. EDUCAT re-confirms the value of possessing high level degrees. 
The factors we analysed in the first regression are all emerging significant even if slightly modified. We 
will  below focus on their ranking in terms of economic  significance, by  calculating  the effective 
marginal effects on the probability of being employed. 
Let us focus now on the interaction terms we test in the regression.  
First, PR1*RES captures the eventual  difference in reputation effects between workers belonging or 
not to  dense „migrant networks‟ such as those envisaged. Its coefficient is negative and significant, 
showing  that  RES  increases  the  probability  of  employment  relatively  less  for  people  belonging  to 
strongly  integrated  communities.  In  order  to  measure  the  overall  effect
19  we  should  sum the two 
coefficients linked to RES and PR1*RES; it is positive and significant. Belonging to network and being 
in the country for a long time increases employability, though with a joint effect  which is lower than 
those associated to the single factors we analyse (RES and PR1). 
Secondly, PR1*EDUCAT is not statistically sig nificant, at least at a 5% threshold.  Its negative sign, 
when we join PR1 and EDUC,  leads to a positive and significant coefficient: belonging to a network 
and having a high degree increases the likelihood of being employed, with respect to the state of no t 
                                                 
18 From ISTAT data, these countries in 2006 are ordered as follows: Albania, Romania, Morocco, China, Ukraine, Polonia, 
Philippines, Tunisia, India, Serbia, Perù, Moldova, Ecuador, Senegal, Egypt.  
19 With reference to the people coming from PR1 countries.    9 
belonging  to  a  community  network  and  having  a  low  quality  degree,  though  as  before  with  an 
economic significance which is lower compared to that of the two single factors accounted separately.  
Third, RES*EDUCAT is also not significant, even at 10%.  The significant sum of the coefficient 
shows that high level degrees and long staying in Italy increases employability. As above, the joint effect 
is less economically significant with respect to the separately accounted factors
20.  
 
Tab. 8:  logistic (2) 
 
Logistic regression 
  Number of obs   =   5986 
Pseudo R2       =  0.2645 
Log likelihood = -3000.306 
EMP  Coef.  z  P>|z| 
       
GEND  0.7046045  7.00  0.000 
AGE  0.421424  25.89  0.000 
AGE2  -0.0052769  -26.91  0.000 
CIV2  -1.02591  -10.42  0.000 
CIV2*GEND  1.675685  11.89  0.000 
CIV3  0.6386607  4.31  0.000 
CIV1  0.0569196  0.28  0.777 
ZONE1  0.1107068  1.14  0.255 
ZONE 2  0.2244251  2.30  0.021 
ZONE 4  -0.5632523  -5.31  0.000 
ZONE 5  -0.4601715  -3.39  0.001 
PR_1  0.8717461  4.14  0.000 
RES  0.0887429  4.68  0.000 
EDUCAT  0.739032  3.25  0.001 
PR_1*RES  -0.0482933  -2.17  0.030 
PR_1*EDUCAT  -0.2655792  -1.87  0.061 
RES*EDUCAT  -0.0115065  -0.52  0.603 
cons  -8.451797  -23.29  0.000 
       
 
Tab. 9: Linear combinations of variables  
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
RES + PR_1*RES = 0  0.0404496  0.0185868  2.18  0.030 
EDUCAT + PR_1*EDUCAT = 0  0.4734528  0.1919594  2.47  0.014 
EDUCAT + RES*EDUCAT = 0  0.7275255  0.2071777  3.51  0.000 
         
 
We now describe and comment on marginal effects, which add food to the economic explanation of 
econometric results. 
As previously noted, we define here as „marginal effect of variable X
j‟ the partial derivative of function f 
with respect to X
j, and not of the estimated probability. This choice depends on the fact that we are 
interested  in  finding  the  marginal  effects  of  the  statistical  significance  of  variables,  and  not  their 
quantitative effect on the variation of estimated probability. As usual, the marginal effect is calculated at 
the average level. We use in this case the average level of EDUCAT (0.498) and PR1 (0.377), while we 
use the median for RES (11)
21 given the different nature of the variable. Tables below 10 and 11 show 
marginal effects and their differences.   
The marginal effect of PR1, RES and EDUCAT are all  significant and positive. The analysis of the 
differences (evaluated for the same values of the variables, mean and median) may show a ranking of 
economic significances. Marginal effects even show some insights: EDUCAT possesses a larger size in 
the coefficient, followed by RES and PR1.  We nevertheless note that the only significant  difference 
between levels of coefficients is between EDUCAT and PR1, while in the other two  remaining cases 
the effect is not  statistically  different. In terms of economic meaning, we may only affirm that 
                                                 
20 Table 9 shows the economic and statistical significance of the sum of coefficients as commented on in the text. 
21 RES=11 means being in Italy for more than 11 years. 59% of the sample belongs to the state „11‟.   10 
education  level  plays  a  major  role  compared  to  that  of  “migrant  network”  in  generating  higher 
employment likelihood for migrants. All other factors impact with the same economic importance if we 
compare the relative influences as above; that is, EDUCAT and PR1 and RES and PR1 show impacts 
which are not different on a joint economic and statistical assessment.  
 
Tab. 10: Marginal effects  
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
PR1  0.207996  0.0938993  2.22  0.027 
RES  0.4116899  0.0903799  4.56  0.000 
EDUCAT  0.5123246  0.0825536  6.21  0.000 
         
 
Tab. 11: Differences in marginal effects  
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
PR1 – RES  -0.203694  0.1498652      -1.36     0.174     
PR1 – EDUCAT  -0.3043286  0.1205864       -2.52     0.012     
RES –  EDUCAT  -0.1006347  0.127157      -0.79        0.429     
         
 
5. Conclusions  
The analysis underlines very important results regarding the adoption and effectiveness of mechanisms 
adopted by immigrants in Italy in order to modify employer‟s beliefs and then their employability. First, 
it emerges that all factors workers may use as strategic assets in the labour market – reputation, migrant 
networks and education level – positively influence the probability of being employed. We may infer 
that such factors in some cases could exert effects as alternative drivers. In fact, we observe that for a 
part of workers high reputation and network migrants factors compensate the low education levels in 
driving employability (e.g. Philippines), while in other cases (Eastern EU people) high education levels 
compensate lower networking and reputation standards. Thus, different migrants use different strategic 
mechanisms as signals to the labour market and as levers of employability. 
Focusing the attention on the three key drivers of employability and interaction effects, it nevertheless 
does not appear they exclude each other systematically, insofar their combined effects increase the 
likelihood of being employed. It remains true that the joint effect is lower in its „economic size‟ as a 
phenomenon if compared to the two single effects taken separately, and this is true for all three couples 
examined regarding reputation, migrant networks and education level.  
The investigation of marginal effects reveals other insights on the economic relevance of the socio-
economic factors we analyse. Based on the three significant marginal effects, the analysis of differences 
between their levels (the relevance) shows that the only meaningful one is between education and 
migrant networking. Education level, in the end, plays a major role compared to the still relevant effect 
of community membership. This results could present a benefit for such migrants (e.g. eastern EU 
workers) associated to higher education level and somewhat low reputation and weaker community 
links, depending on the one hand on high effective and  perceived crime rates associated to some 
eastern EU communities and on the other hand on their historically „younger‟ experience in the Italian 
labour market. In fact, the eastern EU immigration began after the collapse of the soviet world and 
intensified  since  the  late  nineties.  The  migrant  networking  effect  may  well  improve  over  time, 
enhancing its employment relevance, which is now greater for historically old communities, such as 
Philippines  among  others,  which  nevertheless suffer  from lower education levels. Over a dynamic 
scenario, such elements of reasoning could also provide food for thought for policy making. In fact, we 
may expect a relatively increasing stronger weight in the labour market on the side of  eastern EU 
workers, who have also increased more in recent years in terms of size of the population. Weakness 
could one day emerge for other communities that rely on reputation as the only  strategic asset, if 
eastern  EU  people  strengthen  their  networking,  eventually  improve  their  reputation,  and  if  other 
communities do not invest in human capital, instead of only using reputation effects as performance 
drivers. Training, education and labour markets policies should focus on enhancing human capital for 
relatively weaker migrants in this realm, while other public policies may focus on crime rates and the   11 
lower reputation other migrants suffer from. Public policies tackling market failures could be a part of 
the solution towards increased employability and more coherent matching between education level and 
jobs. 
This latter point – the mis match- is an ancillary but relevant objective of labour policies that generates 
high social costs. In the case of migrants, the perpetuating absence of a proper matching between 
education level and job position could discourage educated people to migrate to Italy, especially when 
migrant communities increase their stability and their migrant networks in the country. In this case, as 
the theory of statistical discrimination predicts “it is indeed  very easy to say how social segregation can 
give rise to labour market segregation through network referrals” (Arrow, 1998, p.97). In the presence 
of such a  human capital waste, the risk for the Italian job market is that of losing high educated 
migrant  workers  and  of  perpetuating  a  situation  in  which  migrants  will  be  employed  just  in  low 
occupational levels. The present (actual) supply of highly educated migrants in the Italian job market is 
a chance that deserves much more consideration by policy makers. 
Given the migrants have explained and will explain a large part of employment performances of Italy 
and other EU countries, and labour supply is mainly increasing due to migrants and women entering 
the labour market, the social cost of lower employability and mismatching are to be mitigated as much 
as possible.                 12 
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